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ABSTRACT
Essays on the Provision of Public Goods. (May 2004)
Inkyung Cha, B.A., Ewha Womans University;
M.A., Ewha Womans University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. William S. Neilson
In Chapter II, we present a model that allows us to study the eﬀect of increased
competition among charities for donations, and show that it will result in a lower pro-
vision of public goods. When charities get donations, they must pay two fundraising
costs: a travel cost and an extra cost, a premium in our terminology. This premium
arises from the extra time, eﬀort, or incentives a charity must provide to garner a
contribution from a donor who is solicited by other charities. Increased competition
raises this premium, which leads to deadweight loss, so that revenue net of fundraising
costs falls after a new Þrm enters into the market.
A problem with public goods markets is asymmetric information between chari-
ties and donors, such that donors do not know which charities will cheat. In Chapter
III, we show that honest charities can get more donations than dishonest charities by
investing in a capital stock. We study a two-period model under two assumptions,
one where Þrst-period investment does not aﬀect the provision of public goods in
the second period, and one where Þrst-period investment does aﬀect the provision of
public goods in the second period. In the Þrst case, we prove the existence of a sepa-
rating equilibrium where honest charities make an investment and dishonest charities
invest nothing. Thus, donors will donate more to charities that make investments,
even if the investment is not used to produce public goods. In the second case, honest
charities may invest the eﬃcient amount, overinvest, or underinvest, depending on
iv
the donors beliefs.
In Chapter IV, we borrow parts of the models in the previous two chapters in
order to see what eﬀect the signaling cost has on the number of Þrms and average
revenue. In our model, donor utility increases when they give to a charity that
matches their ideology. We are interested in the long-run equilibrium, so unlike in
Chapter II, we assume there is free entry in the market. The two important results
are that the number of Þrms decreases and average revenue increases if the required
signaling cost increases.
vTo my parents
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three essays concerned with the provision of public goods
in markets with imperfections. There is a well-developed theory of the provision of
private goods, even in markets with various imperfections, such as monopolistic or
oligopolistic market structure and asymmetric information (see for instance Varian
(1992) and Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995)). Unfortunately, this theory
does not always apply to the provision of public goods, because public goods are
nonexcludable and nonrivalrous.
The textbook theory of public goods begins with the observation that the nonex-
cludability property leads to a free rider problem and causes an underprovision of
privately produced public goods. This led some authors to consider the possibility
that the government could redistribute income to get an eﬃcient outcome if the gov-
ernment knows individual preferences perfectly. Lindahl (1919) showed that if there
exists a price which each person is willing to pay for public goods, eﬃciency can be
achieved. Samuelson (1954, 1955) derives the eﬃciency condition for public goods,
which is the summation of all individuals marginal utilities equaling the marginal
cost of provision of public goods. The problem is that individuals preferences for
public goods are not revealed truthfully; because of non-excludability, rational in-
dividuals will have an incentive to hide their true preferences. Several studies have
dealt with this revelation problem. Clarke (1971), Groves (1973), and Groves and
Ledyard (1977) design complicated mechanisms to induce truth-telling about prefer-
ences for public goods by individuals. They designed a two-part tax, which is similar
This dissertation follows the style of the American Economic Review.
2to Vickery (1961)s auction theory, in that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for
individuals. Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) set up a non-cooperative provision
of public goods model where each agent gives the optimal amount of contribution
independent of the actions of others. Recently, Varian (1994) showed that when indi-
viduals contribute sequentially, that is, when they accept commitment, the provision
of public goods is less than with simultaneous contributions.
In each of the models in this dissertation, we consider the behavior of non-proÞt
Þrms which produce public goods, such as medical research, a community theater,
soup kitchen and shelter, and so on. A key characteristic of non-proÞt Þrms is that
they cannot distribute their revenue as proÞt, or more formally, they face a non-
distribution constraint (Hansmann (1980)). They maximize the total of the public
good that is provided instead of maximizing proÞt. So, the analysis of non-proÞt
Þrms in various market structures and with information problems is diﬀerent from
that of the for-proÞt market. This diﬀers from some authors (e.g., Burns and Walsh
(1981)), where charities take advantage of market power in order to maximize proÞt.
Charities exist in our models because some members of society get utility from public
goods, either based on their own consumption or consumption by other people. It is
optimal for a small number of people to specialize in the production of public goods.
Those individuals that run charities then engage in fundraising activities to inform
potential donors about their activities.
In Chapter II, we analyze the eﬀect of competition between charities using Salop
(1979)s circle model. Potential donors solve a two-part problem. First, they choose
whether to donate to any charity at all, and if so, then they have to choose which
charity to donate to. This leads to two costs, a travel cost and a premium cost. The
travel cost is a function of the diﬀerence of ideology between donors and charities,
or alternatively can be interpreted literally as a geographical distance between the
3donors and the charity. The greater the distance between the charity and donor, the
harder the charity will have to work to convince the donors that they provide good
services. The premium cost is similar to a fundraising cost, and comes from the extra
time, eﬀort, or gifts due to increased competition. We assume that the donation is
Þxed, so increased competition will cause new charities to steal donations from the
other charities. The main proposition is that increased competition will result in less
provision of public goods. When charities get donations, they must pay a travel cost
and a premium. Increased competition raises the premium, and causes deadweight
loss, so that net revenue falls after a new Þrm enters into the market.
In related work, Bilodeau and Slivinski (1997) show that small charities produce
more of the public good than large charities, because they will spend the money the
way donors like without cheating. Large charities produce many goods, and they
may therefore produce goods other than what the donor wanted. So then a single
diversiÞed charity will produce less public goods than two rival specialized Þrms.
However, Bilodeau (1992) used a diﬀerent approach to show that a single diversiÞed
charity like the United Way produces more public goods due to lower fundraising
costs, when there is no asymmetric information problem. Probably the closest paper
to chapter II is Rose-Ackerman (1982), which studies excess fundraising by nonproÞt
Þrms. In her paper, when a new nonproÞt Þrm enters the market, whether the
equilibrium fundraising share increases or decreases depends on the elasticity of giving.
The elasticity of giving in her model is the elasticity of average expected gifts with
respect to the solicited population.
In Chapter III, we consider an environment where donors do not know which
charities are honest, that is, charities which will do what they claim with donations.
Hence, we need to design a mechanism that encourages charities to tell the truth.
In our model, the honest charity is concerned with the provision of public goods,
4whereas the bad type charity wants to misuse donations for their own perks, which are
a luxury oﬃce, car, or expensive foreign vacations. A third institution or government
can audit these charities at the end of each period, and the result is publicized. Donors
using this information will not give donations to bad type charities. Hence, honest
charities have a higher probability of continuing the game than the bad type charities
in this environment. Honest charities are therefore willing to invest in capital as a
signal to distinguish themselves from bad type charities. This is the same concept
as Spence (1979)s education signaling model, in which some workers choose to get
an education, even though doing so does not aﬀect the workers productivity. We set
up a two period model and look at two cases, one in which investment aﬀects the
provision of public goods, and one in which investment does not have value in the
production of public goods. Donors beliefs are important. Beliefs inßuence donors
gifts, so the two types of charities will consider future donations when they choose the
level of investment. We prove that a separating equilibrium exists where the honest
charity makes a capital investment and bad type charities invest zero. In the second
case, we show that the optimal investment from high type charities depends on the
donors beliefs. The honest charity wants to distinguish itself from bad type charities.
Hence, it sends a signal to donors because the charity wants to reveal that it will not
cheat when given a donors contribution.
Except for Vesterlund (2003) and Bilodeau and Slivinski (1997), the economics
literature has not dealt with the quality of charities. In Spences (1973) paper, edu-
cation plays a role as a signal. The signal can reveal the high productivity worker,
even if it does not inßuence the workers productivity. So there is the possibility of
overinvestment in education causing ineﬃciency. Spence (2002) explains how when
the signal inßuences productivity, it is possible to achieve eﬃcient investment. He
emphasizes that the employers belief will determine the wage of workers. Similarly,
5in our model, the donation depends on the donors belief. So charities will make a
decision to invest depending on the donors belief. It is possible in Chapter III to get
an eﬃcient outcome, but there is no reason to expect that an eﬃcient outcome will
occur.
Some papers have considered asymmetric information among donors. Varian
(1994) studies a sequential donation game, where donors take turns donating, and
shows that there will be fewer private contributions than with a simultaneous game
(i.e., the free rider problem is worse in a sequential game), as long as the Þrst player
contributes only one time. Other authors have discussed the case where charities
publicize donations. This gives donors prestige (Harbaugh (1998)) or signals the
donors wealth (Glazer and Konrad (1996)). Bac and Bag (2003) adapt the model
of Andreoni (1998) to Þnd the conditions under which a charity will choose to make
announcements about donations. Romano and Yildirim (2001) demonstrate that
there will be more public goods produced in an announcement game than in the
simultaneous game. They compare the traditional case - where donors are concerned
about the total public good - to the warm glow case - where the donors care about
their own donation. In a paper focused on the quality of charities, similar to Chapter
III, Vesterlund (2003) emphasizes the fundraisers role in the process of screening for
high quality charities. The announcement of a donation by one individual is a signal
of quality to other potential donors, and thus reveals the quality of the charity.
In chapter IV, we show that when charities invest in capital as a signal to reveal
that they are honest, this signaling cost aﬀects the number of Þrms, that is, the
diversity of public goods. Many charities produce diﬀerent public goods and each
Þrm has no market power, so that they cannot inßuence the behavior other Þrms.
Each Þrm chooses their giving price by choosing fundraising costs. Because there is
free entry, in equilibrium there will be zero net beneÞt from entry. We show that if
6the signaling cost increases, it will cause a decrease in diversity.
Charities compete for donations like for-proÞt Þrms compete for sales. Compe-
tition does not always lead to higher social welfare. In the case of for-proÞt Þrms,
Mankiw and Whinston (1986) show that free entry causes there to be an ineﬃcient
number of Þrms. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) explain that when a new Þrm en-
ters into the market, the existing Þrms reduce their quantity sold, which they refer
to as a business stealing eﬀect. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) point out the ineﬃciency
of free entry when perfect price discrimination does not exist. In Spence (1976b),
the ineﬃciency of equilibrium results from not catching revenue completely by selling
diﬀerentiated goods. When we allow for large Þxed costs, as with increasing returns
to scale in production, the number of Þrms is not optimal. Lancaster (1975) and
Spence (1976a) show that Þxed costs cause there to be less product diversity. The
results from Chapter IV show that Þxed costs have a similar impact in not-for-proÞt
markets.
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IS COMPETITION AMONG CHARITIES BAD?
A. Introduction
This paper analyzes the eﬀects of increased competition among charities for donations,
and the dead weight loss which results. As motivation for our interest in this topic,
consider the following recent headline:
The AIDS Walk In Washington, D.C., usually attracts close to 25,000
people and raises up to $1 million for AIDS services in the city. This year,
just 5,000 people showed up for the walk and only raised about $400,000.1
After the September 11 attacks, many new charities began providing public ser-
vices, and this has led them to compete with existing charities for donations. The
concern of this paper is on the eﬀects this additional competition has on the fundrais-
ing, and what will be the impact on the total provision of public good.
The papers closest to the present are Rose-Ackerman (1980, 1982). Rose-Ackerman
(1980) presented empirical evidence that United Fund, which in some ways monop-
olize fundraising markets, operating ineﬃciently. Rose-Ackerman (1982) showed that
competition for donations can cause excessive fundraising in the sense that, with
unlimited entry, the cost of the marginal donation exactly equals the amount of that
donation. In her model, charities solicited donations by sending a brochure, which
has a Þxed cost. Competition reduces the expected number and size of the positive
responses to the brochures, and therefore on the amount of funds raised by a given
1Rose Palazzo, abcnews.com, October 29, 2001, Feeling the Pinch - NonproÞts
Reeling Since Sept. 11.
8charity. Our paper takes a diﬀerent approach. Whereas in Rose-Ackermans work
the cost of soliciting a donation from a single individual is Þxed and the yield is
variable, in our model the yield is Þxed but the cost of raising the funds is variable.
This approach reßects the fact that when more charities attempt to raise funds from
the same pool of donors, the charities must work harder to get a given individuals
donation.
We employ a spatial model with a Þxed pool of donors, each of whom has the
same indivisible amount to contribute. To garner a contribution, the fundraiser must
visit the potential donor, resulting in a travel cost. If another charity is soliciting
funds from the same donor, the fundraiser must pay a premium to the donor to
garner the contribution. This premium could take the form of a physical good, like a
coﬀee mug or a T-shirt, but is best thought of as the fundraiser spending more time
and eﬀort with the donor. The donor makes the contribution to the charity that pays
the higher premium for the donation. Both travel costs and the fundraising premia
paid to donors come out of the funds raised by the charity.
Competition in this setting has two eﬀects. First, it reduces travel costs because
any entering charity will be located closer to some donors than incumbent charities
were. Second, competition increases fundraising costs by increasing the premium.
Since funds raised also pay the travel and fundraising costs, it is possible that increased
competition results in a reduced net amount of funds. Our results show that the
fundraising costs rise by more than the travel costs fall, so that increased competition
actually reduces the net amount of funds available for charitable works.
This result can be thought of as a crowding out eﬀect. Several authors have stud-
ied the crowding out eﬀect on donations following government grants. Warr (1983)
presented a model in which if the government gives a grant to individuals in an eﬀort
to redistribute income, it is neutralized by a change in contributions to charitable
9goods. Robert (1984) also showed a dollar-for-dollar crowding out eﬀect in his model.
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1984) have shown that in Nash equilibrium, a small
redistribution of wealth will not change the equilibrium allocation of charitable goods
under certain conditions. All of these authors present neutrality theorems. Andreoni
(1998) showed that when giving is based on impure altruism, the crowing out eﬀect
is incomplete. Straub (2000) estimated the crowding out eﬀect for noncommercial
radio stations and his results showed that there is zero crowding out.
In our model, we study a diﬀerent crowding out eﬀect, that is, with no change
in government grants, we analyze the eﬀect of an increase in the number of Þrms on
funds raised by existing Þrms. The theoretical results show that there exists a super-
crowding out eﬀect. New charities steal donations from existing ones, so that the
total amount of funds raised stays the same. However, increased competition pushes
up the cost of raising funds, resulting in a decrease in the total amount of funds
available for charitable services across charities.
In Section 2, we describe the model. Section 3 shows the main result, and
section 4 provides the conclusion. This paper is the Þrst to analyze competition in
the fundraising market, so we recognize at the outset that additional work is needed.
B. Model
Firms are non-proÞt charities that raise funds in order to provide services. Funds
raised are used for two purposes. If the Þrm raises an amount Fi, it must expend an
amount Ci to do so. The remaining funds, termed available funds and denoted by φi
= Fi−Ci can be used to provide services. There is a production function, U(φi) which
governs the transformation of available funds into charitable services, and is assumed
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to be strictly increasing. The charitys objective is to maximize services produced,
which, since the production function is strictly increasing, implies that it maximizes
available funds.
Firms and donors are located on a circle of unit circumference. Donors are
distributed continuously and uniformly around the circle. Each donor has a Þxed
amount f to donate to charity. Donors will not give to a charity unless a representative
of the charity visits them to ask for the money, though, and so the charity must pay a
travel cost for the donation. If a donor is visited by only one charity, he gives the entire
amount f to that charity. Suppose that the charity is located at point a and that the
donor is located at point x. Then the charity must pay a travel cost of |x−a| to solicit
the donation of f . Obviously, the charity will only solicit donations from people who
are located suﬃciently near the charity; that is, a charity located at point a never
solicits donations from an individual whose location x satisÞes |x − a| > f , because
then the travel cost is more than the solicited donation and the net beneÞt to the
charity is negative. Accordingly, charity i located at point ai has a set of feasible
donors who are located at points in the set Di = {x : |x − ai| ≤ f}. Each set of
feasible donors has length 2f.
If two adjacent Þrms are located farther than 2f apart, they do not compete with
each other for donors because their feasible donor sets do not intersect. If, however,
the two sets do intersect, the charities must compete for donors. Charities can expend
eﬀort in addition to travel costs in an attempt to get donations. If charity i expends
eﬀort ei on a donor, and charity j expends eﬀort ej on the same donor, the donor
gives f to charity i if ei > ej, he gives f to charity j if ej > ei. If ei = ej, the donor
gives f to the closer of the two charities, and if ei = ej and the donor is equidistant
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from both i and j, he gives to neither.2
Now suppose that a donor located at point x is in the feasible donor sets of two
charities, located at a1 and a2, but that charity 1 is closer than charity 2 : |x− a1| <
|x − a2|. As stated above, the donor gives f to charity 1 if e1 ≥ e2 and gives f to
charity 2 if e2 > e1. In equilibrium, it must be the case that at the level of eﬀort
expended by the close Þrm, charity 1, it is unproÞtable for charity 2 to secure the
donation. In other words, e1 = f − |x− a2|, so that if a Þrm is the closest charity to
a donor, it exerts an amount of eﬀort equal to the donation less the distance of the
donor from the second-closest charity. The net beneÞt to charity 1 from the donor
located at x, then, is f − |x− a1|− (f − |x− a2|) = |x− a1|− |x− a2|, which is the
diﬀerence between the distances between the donor and the two charities.
It is now possible to describe the equilibrium behavior of donors and charities.
Suppose that there are n charities located sequentially at a1, ..., an around the circle,
with ai between ai−1and ai+1 for i = 2, ..., n − 1, and an between an−1and a1. The
feasible donor sets are D1, ...,Dn, respectively. Consider a donor located at point x.
Then there exists i ∈ {1, ..., n} such that ai ≤ x ≤ ai+1. Donor x gives f to Þrm i if
|x−ai| < |x−ai+1| and gives f to Þrm i+1 if |x−ai| > |x−ai+1|. Charity i receives
donations from donors in the interval (ai−min{f, (ai−ai−1)/2}, ai+min{f, (ai+1−
ai)/2}), using the conventions that an+1 = a1 and a1−1 = an.
2This last assumption does not matter, because we are not interested in total
contribution, and donors equidistant from two charities represent a set of measure
zero.
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C. Increased competition
Suppose that n charities are located sequentially around the circle, as above. Let
us restrict attention to two charities, 1 and 2, located at a1 < a2. Assume, for the
purposes of this exercise, that for any donor in [a1, a2], the two closest charities are
charities 1 and 2; that is, for any x ∈ [a1, a2], |x−a2| < |x−an| and |x−a1| < |x−a3|.
This assumption implies that the competition for funds from donor x ∈ [a1, a2] is
between charities 1 and 2, and that the premium is based on their relative distances.
Further assume that |a2 − a1| < f , so that every donor in [a1, a2] is subject to
competition for funds. Other cases are possible, and we say more about these later.
Now suppose that a new charity enters at a0 between a1 and a2. This new
charity competes for funds with its two closest competitors. Figure 1 shows how the
charities allocate the donors in the new equilibrium. The segment in contention is
[a1, a2]. Charity 1 keeps donors in the interval
!
a1,
a1 + a0
2
"
, charity 2 keeps donors in#
a0 + a2
2
, a2
$
, and charity 0 receives donations from donors in
#
a1 + a0
2
,
a0 + a2
2
"
.
Since donors in this last interval are served by a closer charity than before, travel
costs for these donations fall. However, since the second-closest charity is closer for
all donors in the interval [a1, a2], fundraising premia rise for all donors.
More detail on the change in fundraising costs is provided by Figure 2. The top,
solid curve represents the fundraising premia after the new charity enters at a0. These
costs peak at the midpoints between the charities. The dashed curve that is second
from the top represents the fundraising premia before the new charity enters. Since
there is less competition before entry, the premia are lower. The area between these
two lines is the additional fundraising cost due to the increasing premia. The dashed
curve at the bottom of the Þgure represents travel costs before entry. These costs are
zero at the locations of the existing charities and peak at the point midway between
13
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Fig. 1. Entry of a New Charity
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them. Finally, the bottom, solid curve represents the travel costs after entry. The
area between the two bottom curves represents the savings in travel costs caused by
entry. Note that all of the line segments in the Þgure have slopes of magnitude one,
either positive or negative.
As is apparent from Figure 2, in region d1, between a1 and (a0+a1)/2, entry leads
to an increase in fundraising costs. Donors in this region do not change who they
donate to, so there is no change in travel cost, but they require a larger premium to
attract their donations. In region d2, between (a0+ a1)/2 and a0, there is an increase
in the required premium but a decrease in travel cost. However, the area A shown in
the Þgure exactly oﬀsets the area A", and so there is a net increase in fundraising costs
in this region. In region d3, between a0 and (a1 + a2)/2, there is again an increase
in premium costs but a decrease in travel costs. The region B is exactly oﬀset by
the region B", though, leaving a net reduction in costs for this region. In region
d4, between (a1 + a2)/2 and (a0 + a2)/2, the increase in the premia (area C) and the
decrease in travel costs (area C "), exactly oﬀset each other, and entry has no net eﬀect
on fundraising costs for this region. Finally, in region d5, between (a0+a2)/2 and a2,
the donors do not change who they donate to, so the only change is an increase in
the premia required to obtain these donations.
As the Þgure shows, entry leads to two (shaded) regions where fundraising costs
increase and one where the costs decrease. As our main result shows, the cost increases
outweigh the cost reductions, so that entry leads to a net increase in fundraising
costs. Since every donor on the interval [a1, a2] was already contributing before entry,
entry does not increase the total amount contributed, but increases the amount spent
on fundraising, and therefore the amount of funds available for charitable services
decreases as a result of entry.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that |ai+1 − ai| < f and |ai+1 − ai| < min{|ai + 2 − ai +
1|, |ai − ai−1|}. If a new charity enters at point a0 ∈ (ai, ai+1), the net funds raised
from donors in [ai, ai+1] decreases.
Proof. For notational ease, let i = 1, and assume without loss of generality that
a0 < (a1 + a2)/2. Divide [a1, a2] into Þve segments, as shown in Figure 1, with the
segments denoted d1, ..., d5. The calculations of the change in total costs correspond-
ing to each segment, while straightforward, are somewhat messy, and therefore are
included in Appendix A.
Integrating and canceling out several of the terms yields ∆ = (a0 − a1)2 +
(a1 + a2 − 2a0)
#
1
2
a0 − 3
4
a1 +
1
4
a2
"
, where ∆ denotes the total fundraising cost after
entry minus the total fundraising cost before entry. The Þrst term is obviously posi-
tive, and the term a1 + a2 − 2a0 is positive by the assumption that a0 < (a1 + a2)/2.
Finally, note that
1
4
[2a0 − 3a1 + a2] = 1
4
[2 (a0 − a1) + (a2 − a1)] > 0,
since a1 < a0 < a2. Consequently, ∆ > 0. There is no increase in the total (gross)
amount of funds raised, so net funds available from donors in [a1, a2] decreases by ∆.
Our result shows that when there are already enough charities so that all donors
are already solicited by at least two charities (the market is saturated), the addition
of new charities increases the costs of fundraising for existing charities by more than
enough to oﬀset the savings in travel costs, and therefore entry reduces the amount
of funds available for charitable works. If the market is not yet saturated, so that
there are some donors who are not yet solicited or are only solicited by one charity,
this result may not hold. Still, though, if entry eventually leads to saturation, further
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entry leads to a decrease in charitable services.
D. Conclusion
We have demonstrated that increased competition among nonproÞt Þrms can lead
to less provision of the public good, resulting in social ineﬃciency. SpeciÞcally, we
deÞned an additional cost resulting from competition between nonproÞt Þrms. This
cost comes in the form of a gift, such as a T-shirt, book or mug, given to donors, or in
the form of increased time and eﬀort spent by the fundraising staﬀ. Using a location
model, we calculated the total cost (travel cost and the extra cost which comes from
competition) before a new Þrm enters into the market, and after it enters. Our main
result shows that when there are suﬃciently many charities already in the market,
total cost increases after the entrant enters into the market, so that the provision of
public goods decreases when there is a Þxed amount of total funds.
Many authors have studied the crowding out eﬀect when government gives a sub-
sidy to charities or a tax break to donors. Little research has studied the crowding out
eﬀect caused by competition between charities. In practice, nonproÞt Þrms expend
large amounts of time and eﬀort raising funds, and even expend large amounts of
time and eﬀort on speciÞc individuals. If there were no competition, Þrms would not
need to make these expenditures, and therefore these expenditures can be considered
a dead weight loss. Also, because this cost depends on the location of the second
closest Þrm, it is independent of the Þrms own location.
Economists are interested in the objective function of nonproÞt Þrms, whether it
is net revenue maximization or total revenue maximization. A few empirical studies
show that some industries maximize net revenue; the other industries maximize total
18
revenue. Khanna, Posnett and Sandler (1995) analyzed fundraising eﬀects on dona-
tions. They found that the health and overseas sectors maximize net revenue, and
the social welfare sector does not, using panel data for the U.K. Okten and Weisbrod
(2000) demonstrated that fundraising has both a positive and a negative eﬀect on
donations. The positive eﬀect is similar to an advertising eﬀect with for proÞt Þrms.
The negative eﬀect on donations emanates from the increased price of giving.3 They
found that charities do not maximize net beneÞt from fundraising, using IRS data,
because they either under-fundraise or over-fundraise. In our paper, competition
among charities leads to excessive fundraising expenses.
3In Okten and Weisbrod (2000), PRICE equals 1/(1 − F − A), F is the share
of fundraising expenditures in donations and A is the share of administrative ex-
penditures in the donation. Employing the same method, Rose-Ackerman (1986)
deÞned the price of giving as ct/ (1− wt−1), where ct is marginal cost and wt−1 is the
fundraising share in the previous period.
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CHAPTER III
INVESTMENT AS A SIGNALING DEVICE FOR CHARITIES
A. Introduction
All else equal, donors prefer to give their donations to honest charities that will
use the funds for charitable works rather than frivolous expenditures. Unfortunately,
donors do not know how charities will use their donations, and determining a charitys
intentions can be expensive or even impossible. If donors have a complete history of
all previous actions taken by the management of a charity, they may be able to
infer the managements preferences. Of course, such extensive information is seldom
available. It would be useful if there were a signal available that revealed the charitys
preferences. The donors need a system that reveals which charities will use their
donations for the intended purpose. We argue that a charitys investment can serve
as that signal.
There is a large literature on signaling as a way to deal with information problems
(see Spence (2002)). The seminal paper by Spence (1973) showed that investment in
education plays a role as a signal that high productivity workers can use to distinguish
themselves from low productivity workers. A very interesting feature of that model
is that high productivity workers will get an education, and Þrms will pay workers
more if they have an education, even though education has no eﬀect on productiv-
ity. Eﬃciency of the education investment has also been analyzed when education
aﬀects productivity.1 Spence (1974) proved the existence of an eﬃcient competitive
1Spence (1976c) deÞnes eﬃcient to mean maximized output net of signaling
cost.
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equilibrium when individual productivity is monotonically increasing with education.
Spence (2002) shows that there exists a fully eﬃcient separating equilibrium as long
as the high productivity workers education level (in the case where education inßu-
ences productivity) is larger than the level of education when the low productivity
worker mimics to get the same wage as the high-type worker. The feature common
to all of these papers is that the informed person sends a signal to the uninformed
person in order to get a higher payoﬀ. The signaling model is the basis for this paper,
as we analyze the problem of imperfect information between charities and donors.
Information problems are very important for the provision of public goods, and
this paper is not the Þrst to have considered the importance of asymmetric informa-
tion in this context. Several papers have discussed strategies for charities to get more
donations in the presence of asymmetric information. Vesterlund (2003) showed that
under imperfect information about the quality of public goods, when the fundraiser
announces contributions, it can reveal the charitys type and avoid the free rider
problem. The initial donor learns information about the quality of the charity, and
the fundraiser make this information common knowledge and announces the Þrst
contribution. This announcement generates more donations compared with no an-
nouncement. Romano and Yildirim (2001) showed that the announcement strategy
has an eﬀect on donations as long as the followers increase their utility based on
their own contribution (the warm glow model). Bac and Bag (2003) show that the
fundraisers decision to reveal the number of donors depends on the public goods pro-
duction function. To provide the public good, it requires a minimum quality thresh-
old, such as a large building for a homeless shelter or equipment for a broadcasting
group. Such threshold investment is made by large contributors. Andreoni (1998)
shows that leadership giving generates additional donations and eliminates corner
solutions. He also shows that such leadership giving can signal to donors that the
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charity is high quality, because the leader can guess the real quality of the charity
by directly interviewing the managers or hiring somebody to evaluate the charity
(Andreoni (2003)).
In our model, the investment capital, whether it relates to productivity or not,
plays a role as a signal of whether the charity is good or bad. Good charities produce
public goods using the donation, while bad charities use the donation for perks such
as a luxury car, foreign vacation, nice oﬃce, etc. We show that the high-type has
a larger discount factor than the low type. The low-type has a possibility of being
audited after it cheats, and this will be revealed to donors. By these mechanisms, we
Þnd a separating equilibrium in which high-types invest to signal their quality, and
low-type charities choose zero investment. But in this equilibrium, we cannot Þnd
eﬃcient investment, which is maximum public goods net of signaling costs. When
the investment has an eﬀect on the provision of public goods, we do Þnd eﬃcient
investment. But there still exists overinvestment for high-type charities in some cases.
The reason is that the donors belief requires too much initial investment, and high-
type charities choose an investment that is greater than its optimal investment.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up the basic model and
explain why the discount factor depends on the charitys preferences. In section 3, we
study signaling when investment is just an expense, adding nothing to the provision
of public goods. In section 4, we show how things change when signaling has an
eﬀect on productivity, and how the Þrms decision of how much to invest as a signal
is diﬀerent. In the last section is the conclusion.
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B. Model
Charities exist for the purpose of providing public goods for society, and donors give
their donation to charities in order to maximize their utility. If a charity conforms
to this goal without cheating, the provision of the public good may be eﬃcient under
perfect information. If donors know that the charity will misuse a portion of their
donation, then they will not give anything to that charity. Unfortunately, donors
do not know whether charities will provide the public good or do other things with
the money. Honest charities want to reveal their intentions to donors in order to get
more donations, but the dishonest charities have an incentive to mimic the honest
charities. Therefore, the honest charities need a mechanism to distinguish themselves
from dishonest ones.
We begin by analyzing a simple two-period model. The utility of charity i de-
pends on the provision of the public good in the Þrst period, Gi1, the amount of
public good provided in the second period, Zi2, and perks, P
i
t for i = H, L. The
utility function for type H charities is
UH = G
H
1 + β
HZH2 , (3.1)
and for type L charities is
UL = P
L
1 + β
LPL2 . (3.2)
The high-type charity is only concerned with providing the public good, whereas the
low-type charity prefers to misuse the donations for their own perks.
Each charity can be audited by a third institution or government with positive
probability after the Þrst period. After the audit, if the charity is found to have
misused any donations, this is revealed to the public, and donors will not give any
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more donations to that charity. For type i the continuation probability (which can
also be thought of as a discount factor) is βi = 1 − γi, where γi is the probability
that charity i is caught cheating. For high-type charities, the discount factor, βH =
1/(1 + r), where r is the interest rate, equals one, because they never cheat their
donors, meaning γH = 0. When the low-type charity spends some donations on
perks, that fact is observed by an audit with probability γL > 0, and therefore the
low-type charitys discount factor is βL = γL/(1 + r) < βH . Hence, the high-type
and low-type charities have diﬀerent probabilities of remaining in the market if the
low-type charity spends any of its contributions on perks.
In the Þrst period, each charity gets a donation, D1, that is distributed among
the provision of the public good, Gi1, perks, P
i
1, and investment, I
i
1. After donors
observe the charitys investment choice, they make a donation. In the second period,
the donation, if any, is used for the provision of the public good, Gis, and perks, P
i
2.
Investment is not necessary in the second period, because the game ends after the
second period is over.
Donors give donations if they believe the charity is high-type, and the charities
will invest if they expect to get suﬃciently large donations. We specify the donors
beliefs about the charity, because their beliefs determine their giving. Donors have
beliefs such that if charity is Þrst period capital investment, I i1, is bigger than a
threshold I, donors believe with probability one that the charity is high-type. For-
mally:
Pr(type = H| I i1 ≥ I) = 1
and
Pr(type = H| Ii1 < I) = 0.
This belief aﬀects the donors gift. If I i1 ≥ I the donor contributes DH2 to the charity,
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and if I i1 < I the donor contributes D
L
2 < D
H
2 . The two types of charities consider
future donations when they decide the level of investment to signal. If the low-type
charity wants to get donations in the second period, it will have to make the same
investment as the high types. But if the charity with a low continuation probability
wants to get donations, it will have to pay a higher opportunity cost of investment
than the high-type charity, which is the sacriÞce of perks.
The charitys budget constraints are as follows. In the Þrst period the donation
is the same for all charities and the budget constraint is
Gi1 + I
i
1 + P
i
1 = D1.
The donation can be spent on some combination of the public good, perks, and
investment. In the second period investment is no longer an option, and donations
depend on Þrst-period investment. Let the function D2(I1) denote the second-period
donation when the Þrst-period investment is I1. It is given by
D2(I1) =

DH2 I1 ≥ I
if
DL2 I1 < I
In addition, the capital accumulated through Þrst period investment may or may not
be productive. More explicitly, the Þrst-period investment may allow the charity to
produce more of the public good with the same amount of donation. If the charity
devotes Gi2 to the public good, output of the public good is
Z2 = G2 · (1 + f(I1)),
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where f(I) ≥ 0 for all I ≥ 0. If f(I) = 0 for all I ≥ 0 the investment is said to be
unproductive, and if f(I) > 0 for all I > 0 the investment is said to be productive.
We refer to f(·) as the public good technology function. The second-period budget
constraint is
Gi2 + P
i
2 = D2(I1).
C. Equilibrium without productivity of capital
The previous section described the game that is played between honest charities,
dishonest charities, and donors. This section studies the game when investment in
the Þrst period has no eﬀect on second period public goods production. The donors
beliefs aﬀect their gifts, and the two types of charities consider future donations
when they decide the level of investment to signal. Because donors do not know
a charitys type, the high-type charity must reveal its type through investment, so
we need an incentive for charities to tell the truth. The two types require diﬀerent
conditions for truth-telling. Since the high-type gets no utility from either perks
or investment, it spends nothing on perks and spends either I1 = I or I1 = 0 on
investment. Consequently, its utility is either D1 − I + βHDH2 in the case that it
invests I or D1 + β
HDL2 if it invests nothing. It chooses investment I1 = I if the
following condition is satisÞed:
D1 − I + βHDH2 ≥ D1 + βHDL2
which reduces to the condition I ≤ βH(DH2 −DL2 ).
The low-type charity has three choices. It can choose not to invest, in which
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case it spends its entire Þrst-period donation on perks since the public good generates
no utility. If it survives to the second period it receives the low donation DL2 and
spends it all on perks. Its discounted utility from investing nothing is D1 + β
LDL2 .
Its second option is invest I so that it can receive the high donation in the second
period. Its discounted utility is then D1 − I + βLDH2 . Finally, it can choose to
behave honestly, in which case it has no chance of being caught and shut down, so
that its discount factor is βH instead of βL. To behave honestly it invests I so that
it gets the high donation in the second period and it spends the remaining D1− I on
the public good. Its discounted utility is βHDH2 .
If
D1 + β
LDL2 ≥ βHDH2
the low-type charity is better oﬀ investing nothing than behaving honestly to eliminate
the possibility of being caught cheating. If
D1 + β
LDL2 ≥ D1 − I + βLDH2
the low-type charity is better oﬀ investing nothing than investing I and consuming
the rest as perks. This reduces to the condition I ≥ βL(DH2 −DL2 ).
Proposition 2 Consider any combination (βH , βL, DH2 , D
L
2 ) with β
H > βL and D1+
βLDL2 ≥ βHDH2 . Then for any beliefs I ∈ [βL(DH2 −DL2 ), βH(DH2 −DL2 )], there exists a
separating equilibrium where high-type charities make the threshold capital investment,
I, and low-type charities invest zero.
Proof. See above.
In this case, the high-type charity overinvests to distinguish itself from the low-
type charity. With full information, the charities choose zero investment, which is
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socially optimal. Since investment is just an expense, and is not used for producing
public goods, it always leads to a waste of resources when capital is unproductive.
D. Equilibrium with productivity of capital
We have shown that even if capital is not useful for producing public goods, investment
will lead to the existence of at least one separating equilibrium. There will in general
be many separating equilibria, depending on preferences and the Þrst and second
period donations. We now show what happens if investment aﬀects the second-period
provision of the public good.
We know that the utility function is given in equation (1) for the high-type
charity. We maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint and public good technology
function. Substitute the constraints into the public goodG1 and Z2 to get the charitys
problem:
max D1 − IH1 + βHD2(IH1 )(1 + f
)
IH1
*
).
Substituting for D2(I), we rewrite this problem,
max

D1 − IH1 + βH ·DH2 · (1 + f
)
IH1
*
) IH1 ≥ I
if
D1 − IH1 + βH ·DL2 · (1 + f
)
IH1
*
) IH1 < I
Let I∗1 maximize D1− I1+βH ·DH2 · (1+ f (I1)), so that f´ (I∗1 ) = 1/βH ·DH2 , and
let +I1 maximize D1 − I1 + βH · DL2 · (1 + f (I1)), so that f´(+I1) = 1/βH ·DL2 . Since
DL2 < D
H
2 and f is increasing, it follows that I
∗
1 > +I1. DeÞne ,I1 to be the value of
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I1 > I
∗
1 such that
D1 − ,I1 + βH ·DH2 · (1 + f -,I1.) = D1 − +I1 + βH ·DL2 · (1 + f -+I1.).
The relationship between I∗1 , +I1, and ,I1 is shown in Figure 1.
It is now possible to describe the solution to the high-type charitys maximization
problem. If I ≤ I∗1 the charity invests I∗1 . Since the constraint that I1 ≥ I in the
objective function is non-binding, it has no impact on the solution. If I > I∗1 two
cases emerge. First, if I > ,I1 the charity does worse investing enough to get the
higher donations than it does by investing +I1. Second, if I∗1 < I ≤ ,I1 the charity
does best by investing I. Consequently, the high-type charitys optimal investment
is given by the function
IH1 (I) =

I∗1 I ≤ I∗1
I if I∗1 < I ≤ ,I1+I1 I > ,I1
. (3.3)
The low-type charitys investment decision is simpler. Investment plays two
roles: it enables the charity to transform second-period donations into a larger
amount of the public good and, if it is suﬃciently high to make donors believe the
charity is high-type, it increases second-period donations. Since the low-type charity
does not value provision of the public good, the productivity aspect of investment is
irrelevant and the investment decision matches that of the unproductive investment
case. Assuming thatD1+β
LDL2 ≥ βHDH2 so that the charity always prefers investing
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nothing to behaving honestly, the low-type charitys investment function is
IL1 (I) =

I I < βL(DH2 −DL2 )
if
0 I ≥ βL(DH2 −DL2 )
. (3.4)
Proposition 3 Consider any combination (βH , βL, DH2 , D
L
2 ) with β
H > βL and D1+
βLDL2 ≥ βHDH2 . Then the investment functions for the two types of charities are given
by (3.3) and (3.4). If βL(DH2 −DL2 ) ≤ I ≤ I∗1 then there exists a separating equilibrium
in which high-type charities invest the eﬃcient amount and low-type charities invest
zero. Furthermore, if max(βL(DH2 −DL2 ), I∗1 ) < I ≤ ,I1 then there exists a separating
equilibrium in which high-type charities overinvest and low-type charities invest zero.
Proof. See above.
Spence (2002) shows that there exists a fully eﬃcient separating equilibrium as
long as the high productivity workers education level (in the case where education
inßuences productivity) is larger than the level of education when the low productivity
worker mimics to get the same wage as the high-type worker. Otherwise, there exists
overinvestment, so the equilibrium is ineﬃcient. Here we have shown the existence
of a fully separating equilibrium for our model when investment aﬀects productivity,
although there may or may not be overinvestment. When the threshold value I
determined by the donors belief is smaller than the eﬃcient level of investment,
the separating equilibrium has eﬃcient investment by the high-type charity. When
the threshold value is higher than the eﬃcient level of investment, though, there is
overinvestment in the separating equilibrium.
Figure 3 shows the range for which there is overinvestment. In the interval A, the
high-type Þrm chooses the optimal investment I∗1 , so this is eﬃcient. In interval C, it
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Fig. 3. High-type Charity Investment Choices
wants less investment, so it chooses +I1, because signaling is so expensive that doing
so lowers utility. In interval B, it chooses the threshold investment I, because then
it gets the high donation and is better oﬀ. This investment is more than the optimal
investment with full information, I∗1 , so there exits overinvestment and interval B is
the set of ineﬃcient allocations. Which one is seen in practice depends on the donors
beliefs.
E. Conclusion
We have studied a model where donors do not know which charity will cheat them
after they donate money. In this model, we show how investment can serve as a
signal for honest charities. When investment has no eﬀect on the provision of public
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goods, that is, it is only a device to distinguish honest from dishonest charities, many
separating equilibria exist. If investment aﬀects the provision of public goods, then we
Þnd that there can be eﬃcient investment even in a separating equilibrium. Because
of imperfect information, investment as just a signaling device is ineﬃcient compared
with full information, but when investment increases public goods production, we
can get eﬃcient investment. The charitys choice depends on the donors beliefs. If
the donors belief is too conservative, it is not worthwhile for the Þrm to invest, even
if it looks like a dishonest charity. It results from a concave investment function.
In contrast, if the donors required investment is less than the charitys maximized
optimal investment, the charity chooses the optimal investment, and it is eﬃcient. If
the donors requirement is larger than the maximized optimal investment, but not
too much larger, the charity will invest the threshold amount in order to get the large
donation. This results in overinvestment and it causes an ineﬃcient market outcome.
In our paper, an interesting result is that if investment aﬀects the provision of the
public good, we can get the same equilibrium as with full information, but depending
on donors beliefs, there may also exist overinvestment in the market.
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CHAPTER IV
SIGNALING COSTS AND THE OPTIMAL NUMBER OF CHARITIES
A. Introduction
In the previous chapter, we saw that imperfect information is very important for the
provision of public goods. When donors dont have information about which charities
are good, high quality charities (ones that dont cheat) want to reveal their preferences
so that they can be distinguished from low quality charities. This chapter studies the
equilibrium where charities signal and receive a donation, and if they dont signal,
they get no donations. As in the previous chapter, charities must expend investment
on a signal such as a big building, equipment, or hiring famous people for fundraising,
whether it helps to produce public goods or not. We study the eﬀects of this signaling
cost, which can be thought of as an entry tax or license fee, on the number of Þrms
and the price of giving in a monopolistically competitive public goods market.
Study of the relationship between entry and product diversity in for-proÞt indus-
tries has a long history. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) demonstrate that free entry
results in an ineﬃcient number of Þrms compared to the social optimum, that is,
there exists excessive entry. When new Þrms enter into the market, the incumbent
Þrm will decrease its quantity in response to the new Þrms entry. This means that
new Þrms steal quantity from existing Þrms. New Þrms have an incentive to enter
into the market to capture that revenue. Such a business stealing eﬀect happens
in a homogenous market. But this excessive entry does not hold anymore when we
consider a heterogeneous production market. When the entrant produces new pro-
duction, it will improve social welfare, because Þrms cant capture all surplus from
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consumer without perfect price discrimination. So a lower number of Þrms enter into
the market compared with the socially optimal number. This point has also been dis-
cussed in Spence (1976b). He demonstrates that product selection will decline with
entry because total surplus which after new Þrms enter the market doesnt equal to
summation of products marginal contribution. Fixed costs are another cause of in-
suﬃcient product diversity. Lancaster (1975) and Spence (1976a) show that the Þxed
cost causes less product diversity. Berry and Waldfogel (1996) demonstrate in an
empirical paper that the diﬀerence between the socially optimum welfare and welfare
under free entry results in ineﬃciency in the radio broadcasting.
As demonstrated by the authors cited above, there are many studies of welfare
and product diversity in private markets. In nonproÞt markets, some characteristics
are similar to the monopolistic competition market, even though the Þrms may not
maximize proÞt. Non-proÞt Þrms can maximize their net revenue and choose their
fundraising cost. Rose-Ackerman (1982) points out that donors want to give their gifts
to charities which are close to their ideology. This is modeled as the distance between
the charity and the donor in our model. Her study shows that the competition for
donations leads to a big fundraising share, deÞned as fundraising cost/donations, but
she assumes that charities can rank donors by donations and calculate the expected
donation. Charities send the brochures Þrst to high ranking donors whom charities
guess are closest to their preferences. Hence, donors behavior is actually passive,
in that the donor giving more donations depends on the charities best guesses. She
mentions also that free entry might decrease the fundraising share in equilibrium if en-
try makes for less elasticity of giving with respect to the proportion of the population
who is solicited by charities. The solicited population decreases with an increased
number of Þrms and lowers the elasticity of giving according to extra fundraising.
Hence, the equilibrium fundraising share falls. But when there exist a very large
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number of charities in the market, the fundraising share will rise. As the number
of Þrms approaches inÞnity, then the number of solicited donors goes to one. This
means that the fundraising expense equals expected donations.
We adapt Salop (1979)s circle model, so that donors utility depends on diversity,
and charities maximize net revenue. The signaling cost, used to overcome problems
with imperfect information, is a Þxed cost and it plays a role as an entry barrier.
Under free entry, the number of Þrms is less than the social optimum due to signaling
costs. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is the basic model, section 3 studies
the case where the price of giving is constant, and the last section is the conclusion.
B. Basic Model
We brießy summarize the model from chapter II here. Donors are located on a circle
of circumference 1. The location of a donor represents her ideology along the lines of
Rose-Ackerman (1982). Donors never change their location, but charities produce a
single public good and choose their location on the circle endogenously as described
below. Charities are free to change their location costlessly. They reevaluate their
location each time a new Þrm enters the market and decide whether or not to move,
and if so, where to move.
Charities face three diﬀerent costs if they want to produce public goods. The
signaling cost is paid by good quality charities (those that dont cheat) because they
want to distinguish themselves from low quality charities. For instance, that could
be a big building or equipment, and can be thought of as an entry tax or license fee.
The travel cost is the physical distance between donors and charities, or diﬀerences in
preferences between them, and whether it is the former or latter case doesnt matter.
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The premium cost comes from free gifts such as books, mugs and t-shirts given to
donors, but is also more time and eﬀort spent on donors due to increased competition.
Charities maximize total net revenue. In the circle model, donors are distributed
continuously and uniformly. The charities try to get donations from the closest donors
(those with the lowest travel cost). Hence, the utility of charities, V , is as follows.
V = 2
1
2n/
0
(d∗ − z) dz − S (4.1)
where z = |x − a| is the distance between donor x and charity a, d∗ is the donation
chosen by the donor, n is the total number of charities, and s is the signaling cost.
Net revenue is equal to the optimal donation minus the travel cost. One thing that
stands out in equation (1) is that there is only a travel and signaling cost. So, unlike
in chapter II, we Þrst assume the premium cost is equal to zero, meaning the charity
gives no gifts or special attention to donors even if a new charity enters the market.
The premium cost is important, but this chapter focuses on the eﬀect of the signaling
cost. By ignoring the premium cost, we can study a simple model that shows the
eﬀect of the signaling cost on the diversity of public goods. We leave the extension
to the case of endogenous premium cost for future work.
Donors utility increases with a smaller distance, z, because small z means that
the donors preferences are close to the charitys characteristics. When donations
increase for a given income, private consumption will decline. Hence, private con-
sumption depends on the distance only indirectly. The donors utility function can
then be rewritten as
U = U(c(z), d(1− z)), (4.2)
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where c is private consumption and d is the donation. Even though the consumption
of private goods is not related to the distance z directly, we can make a monotonic
transformation and get donors utility function as in the equation (2), subject to the
constraint
y = c+ d,
where y is income. The utility function is concave with Uc > 0, Ud > 0, Ucc < 0, Udd <
0 and Ucd < 0. As explained above, cz > 0 and dz < 0.
C. Equilibrium without premium cost
In this section, we assume donors maximize a Cobb-Douglas utility function:
maxU = czd1−z
s.t. c+ d = y.
Each price equals one. The premium cost aﬀects the price of giving and it aﬀects the
donors decision indirectly. The price of giving means the value of the public good
provided by charities after the fundraising cost and administration cost is subtracted
from the total donation, that is, 1/(1− F −A), where F is the fundraising cost and
A is the administration cost. It is impossible to calculate the administration cost,
so in practice economists have used fundraising costs to calculate the price of giving.
Steinberg (1986) Þnds that the price of giving doesnt aﬀect donations in his empirical
paper, but Rose-Ackerman (1982) points out that donors are sensitive to the price
of giving, and Okten and Weisbrod (2000) show that fundraising expenditures cause
donations to increase due to better information from advertisements. They also have
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a negative eﬀect on donations indirectly, because the price of giving is higher than for
the case without fundraising. In our model, the premium share is used to measure
fundraising share. In this section we consider the price of giving as exogenous and
premium share is equal to zero.
The optimal private consumption and donation given price can be found using
the Þrst order conditions:
c∗ = zy
d∗ = (1− z)y.
Charities maximize utility, V , which is equal to net revenue. In equilibrium, the
donors are located at x ∈ (1, 1/n) and each charity can get donations inside that
range. When the charity considers the closest donor, it maintains a possible area
where it can induce donations from the right side and left side of Þrm, 1/2n from the
charitys location on either side. Given the optimal donation, charities can calculate
total net revenue without signaling cost, V :
V = 2
1
2n/
0
((1− z)y − z) dz = 1
4
−y − 1 + 4yn
n2
. (4.3)
Under imperfect information, good charities want to send a signal to donors
as to their real type in order to get more donations than the bad charities. This
is a necessary condition for charities to show that they have no incentive to cheat
donors and will produce the public good when they receive a donation. Chapter III
studied this cost in more detail and showed that an equilibrium exists with good
charities signaling an amount S, and receiving a positive donation, and bad charities
not signaling and receiving no donation. What is important here is that this signaling
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cost is a Þxed cost, and when the new charities want to enter the market, they have
to pay it. Therefore, to decide whether to enter this market or not, the decision rule
is to enter if net revenue, V0, is at least equal to zero when the signaling cost is S:
V0 = V − S = 1
4
−y − 1 + 4yn
n2
− S ≥ 0. (4.4)
In equation (4), if V0 < 0, charities have no incentive to enter the market. We assume
free entry, which allows us to state the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When the required signaling cost increases, the number of charities
decreases if n is suﬃciently large.
Proof. To Þnd dn/dS, we take the total derivative of equation (4) with respect to
the number of Þrms and signaling cost, and get V "(n) · dn = dS, so that
V "(n) =
d(1
4
−y−1+4yn
n2
)
dn
= −1
2
2yn− y − 1
n3
. (4.5)
Therefore dn/dS = 1/V "(n). Substitute this result for V "0(n) into dn/dS = 1/V
"
0(n) :
dn
dS
=
−2n3
2yn− y − 1 < 0 if n >
1 + 1/y
2
. (4.6)
This result explains two things. The Þrst is that charities net revenues decrease
with the number of Þrms if n is large enough in equation (5). Even though increased
competition leads to less travel cost (closer ideology), the territory, 1/n, where a
charity is able to get donations decreases in equilibrium. If the territory decreases
more than the decrease in travel cost, then net revenue will shrink. Secondly, the
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signaling cost makes for less product diversity according to equation (6). We assume
that each Þrm produces one public good. The signaling cost is a barrier to entry for
potential Þrms. Hence, because of this Þxed cost, the equilibrium number of Þrms
will fall. If n is a large number, n > (1 + 1/y)/2, the total net revenue falls, so when
they spend on signaling, charities revenue may be negative in equilibrium.
The condition for product diversity to fall with a higher signaling cost is poten-
tially very restrictive. Furthermore, it is diﬃcult to understand the intuition behind
a higher signaling cost leading to greater diversity of charity. The following lemma
clariÞes the issue: anytime there are already charities in the market, the equilibrium
amount of diversity will fall. In practice, this may not be observed due to the integer
problem, of course.
Lemma 5 If n is at least equal to one (i.e., if it is optimal for some charities to exist
in the market), then
dn
dS
< 0 (integer problem ignored).
Proof. The condition for entry is that V0 = V − S = 1
4
#−y − 1 + 4yn
n2
"
−S ≥ 0.
If V0 =
1
4
#−y − 1 + 4yn
n2
"
−S = 0, then solving for the optimal number of charities
for arbitrary y and S, we Þnd n∗ =
2y ±04 (y2 − Sy − 1)
4S
. But y2 − Sy − 1 ≥ 0
requires y > 1. Thus, to have a real optimal number of charities, a necessary (but
not suﬃcient) condition is that y > 1. From above,
dn
dS
= − 2n
3
2yn− y − 1 . If y > 1
and n ≥ 1, then dn
dS
< 0.
D. Conclusion
We used a simple circle location model and analyzed the eﬀect of signaling costs on
the number of Þrms, that is, the diversity of production and premium share. When
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the signaling cost is Þxed, it is a barrier to entering into the market. The charities
are willing to invest in this signaling, because they want to reveal their quality to get
more donations, otherwise they will lose donors. Announcement of donations may
be signaling, but in this case the cost is trivial. In our model, signaling requires
incurring a cost like in Spence (1973)s education model. The diversity of public
goods decreases with signaling cost. An interesting future research project would
be to make the choice of the premium cost endogenous for each charity. If charities
choose three kinds of costs, travel cost, premium cost and signaling cost, even though
it would be a very complicated model, requiring a general equilibrium analysis, it
would be more realistic. Whether it would cause a change in our results cannot be
determined without actually setting up and solving the model.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This dissertation has explored the implications of two types of market imperfections in
public goods markets, imperfect competition and asymmetric information. The eﬀects
of these two imperfections has been studied in a large number of papers for the case
of private goods, but only a few economists have studied information problems and
imperfect competition as they relate to the provision of public goods. The important
diﬀerence between the two types of markets is the diﬀerent optimization problems
solved by consumers and Þrms. In private goods markets, Þrms sell products to
consumers. Consumers make purchases so as to maximize their own utility from
consumption. In public goods markets, Þrms solicit donations from their consumers
and then provide services to other people. The objective of non-proÞt Þrms is to
maximize the provision of public goods.
In chapter II, we demonstrated the eﬀect of changes in competition among chari-
ties using a circle model. There exists two types of costs, a travel cost and a premium
cost due to fundraising. When one Þrm enters between two existing Þrms, the new
Þrm steals donations from incumbents. Hence, the existing Þrms have an incentive to
increase fundraising expenditures in order to not lose the donor. Under the assump-
tion that donations are Þxed, we showed that donors give that amount of money to the
closest Þrm. We then proved that increased competition leads to a higher premium
cost (fundraising expenditure), but less travel cost, with the increase in premium cost
always dominating.
This is interesting, because it is not a priori clear which eﬀect will be larger.
If a new charity enters into the market, then that will lead to lower travel costs.
Intuitively, one way to interpret the travel cost is that charities need to invest some
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time and money to convince donors that they provide a useful service. If a new charity
enters with a new ideology, that ideology will appeal to many donors. It will then
be easier for the new charity to get money from those donors than it was for the old
charities. The new charity therefore has to expend less eﬀort to get donations, and the
expenditures are basically wasted money. Yet in all cases, the entry leads to greater
competition and thus higher total fundraising expenditures because old charities will
Þght to keep their donors. Our result may be changed if increased competition leads
to an increase in donations, but that is really a diﬀerent issue. We are interested
in the eﬀects of competition for existing donors. The key proposition in this essay
proved the result that increased competition always makes for less provision of public
goods. In private goods markets, on the other hand, it is usually thought that more
competition is a good thing.
In chapter III, we considered a diﬀerent problem, that of imperfect information
between donors and the charity. The question we asked is, What happens if the
donors do not know how the charity will spend their donations? Under some as-
sumptions, such as knowledge of the management of the charitys utility function, or
all previous actions taken by the management of the charity, the donors might be able
to solve a complicated signal-extraction problem and Þgure out how donations will be
spent. However, we are interested in the case where donors have limited information
about the charitys management. We assume instead that the donor can only observe
the charitys capital stock (such as oﬃce building, statue, etc.). There is a possibility
of being audited each period and found to have cheated. If they ever cheat, that
becomes public information and the charity does not get anymore donations.
Under these simple assumptions, we analyze the possibility that the charity can
use investment in capital to help solve the imperfect information problem. Donors
beliefs about the honesty of the charity conditional on the charitys capital stock
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determines their donation. Charities will choose their investment in capital in order
to reveal their true type. In the benchmark case, we assume that the capital stock
has no value in production of the public good. The capital stock only serves as a
signal and provides no other service. When this investment does not inßuence the
provision of public good, we proved the existence of a separating equilibrium where
the high type invests in capital and the low type invests zero. If the provision of
public goods is increased by greater investment, then we get optimal investment as
long as meeting the donors belief is not too expensive. If the donors belief is such
that a very large capital stock is necessary to be seen as an honest charity, charities
will not choose investment because the cost is too expensive. If the threshold capital
stock is suﬃciently small, honest charities will always invest to distinguish themselves
from the dishonest charities.
The signaling cost is a Þxed cost. This Þxed cost is an entry barrier for new
Þrms to enter into the market. This leads to a connection between the models in
the chapters II and III. In chapter IV, we study a circle model and show that the
signaling cost from chapter III inßuences the diversity of production. We show that
the existence of a Þxed cost causes the number of Þrms to decrease.
There are at least two ways to extend the research. First, we could apply nu-
merical methods and simulations of the monopolistic competition and asymmetric
information models of public goods. Dixit (2002) suggests that this is a very fruitful
way to attack models of the sort in this dissertation because of their complicated
features. Dixit (2002) discusses setting up a new model of the public sector using
a location model joint with a representative consumer model of monopolistic com-
petition and solving by numerical methods. Second, we have not allowed for the
existence of a government sector. Further study of the eﬀects of government behavior
in public goods markets with imperfections may potentially be fruitful. These topics
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are interesting, but are left for future research.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER II SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
This appendix presents the change in total cost for all Þve areas following entry. For
area d1, the total cost was originally
/ a1+a0
2
a1
[|x1 − a1|+ f − |a2 − x1|] dx1.
After entry, it becomes
/ a1+a0
2
a1
[|x1 − a1|+ f − |a0 − x1|] dx1.
For area d2, the total cost was originally
/ a0
a1+a0
2
[|x2 − a1|+ f − |a2 − x2|] dx2.
After entry, it becomes
/ a0
a1+a0
2
[|a0 − x2|+ f − |x2 − a1|] dx2.
For area d3, the total cost was originally
/ a1+a2
2
a0
[|x3 − a1|+ f − |a2 − x3|] dx3.
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After entry, it becomes
/ a1+a2
2
a0
[|x3 − a0|+ f − |x3 − a1|] dx3.
For area d4, the total cost was originally
/ a2+a0
2
a1+a2
2
[|a2 − x4|+ f − |x4 − a1|] dx4.
After entry, it becomes
/ a2+a0
2
a1+a2
2
[|x4 − a0|+ f − |a2 − x4|] dx4.
For area d5, the total cost was originally
/ a2
a2+a0
2
[|a2 − x5|+ f − |x5 − a1|] dx5.
After entry, it becomes
/ a2
a2+a0
2
[|a2 − x5|+ f − |x5 − a0|] dx5.
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